A former boss of Airbus and parliamentary commissioner on how to turn Europe into a global power – the Economist – 17.04.25

It starts with Germany realising that it’s stronger than it feels, argue Thomas Enders and Hans-Peter Bartels.

WHEN THE chief of Germany’s army quotes Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist philosopher, it signals a shift in tone. “The old world is dying, the new one struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters,” said General Alfons Mais recently. The pendulum that once swung to globalisation and rules-based order is now arcing back towards protectionism and imperial spheres of influence.

The world is turning colder, harder. The West is fracturing.

This tectonic shift puts immense pressure on Germany and Europe. The Old World must finally become capable of acting as a global power. That requires a foreign and security policy that sheds the comfortable doctrines of the past. Germany can no longer preach “leadership from the centre”, as it did under Angela Merkel, or mask geopolitical inertia as “restraint”, as Olaf Scholz has done.

Germany is the most populous and economically powerful country in Europe, the second-richest NATO member and, despite challenges, still the world’s third-largest economy. The country is more potent than it feels.

According to a survey by the Munich Security Conference, 51% of Americans and 58% of Chinese consider Germany a “great power”. Only 22% of Germans agree. After 1945 we aspired at most to be an economic power—later, preferably a moral one. But political and military power? “Never again!” That luxury of geopolitical escapism is one that Germany, and Europe, can no longer afford.

Germany’s underfunded, overstretched military must quickly become Europe’s strongest conventional force. The Bundestag’s move to lift the debt brake for defence provides the foundation. Money is no longer the issue. Friedrich Merz, the incoming chancellor, has channelled Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” promise—this time in reference to defence spending. If military planners get their way, a reintroduced form of conscription could help grow the Bundeswehr, Germany’s armed forces, from 180,000 to 250,000 active soldiers, plus 200,000 reservists.

It is, objectively, in America’s national-security interest to have allies on both its flanks, Atlantic and Pacific. And America can only claim to be an “exceptional” nuclear superpower if it can deter its main nuclear rival, Russia, from using its arsenal to threaten and invade neighbouring states. Yet America today seems oddly indifferent to such core strategic interests. NATO may soon have to manage without a credible American security guarantee.

In such uncertain times, a European “coalition of the willing” must take shape, militarily and politically. France and Britain, Europe’s two nuclear powers, must lead. But Germany, owing to its size, economic weight and central geography, has an indispensable role. Poland, too, should be part of this core group. Not all NATO or EU members need to be included, but Britain, Norway and Canada must be welcome.

A European Defence Community should be set up on similar terms, to build a strong European pillar within NATO. Its future military headquarters would be staffed and run solely by those genuinely committed to self-defence. Kremlin-friendly states like Hungary and Slovakia probably wouldn’t take part; nor would neutrals like Austria and Ireland, or, for now, Turkey. This Euro-NATO group would represent countries with some 500m people, 1.5m troops and combined GDP of €20trn ($22.6trn). The EU could support it—with tools such as subsidised defence loans or financial incentives—but not lead it.

Working towards a European defence backstop without America does not mean abandoning the transatlantic alliance. All treaties and plans would remain in force, unless America tore them up and truly, irreversibly, walked away. In that case, a Plan B must be ready, complete with a nuclear deterrent provided by Britain and France, and the extension of the nuclear umbrella to others. Germany’s role would be limited to co-financing, hosting and supplying delivery systems—as it already does. A national nuclear arsenal is ruled out by the Two Plus Four Treaty that made German reunification possible.

Europe and Canada must prepare for this scenario—not just as a thought experiment, but through real planning, both in terms of command structures and military capabilities. Europe’s defence industry should be ready to compensate for a potential American absence, quickly and at scale.

The parties that will form Germany’s new coalition government—the CDU/CSU and the SPD—have already identified the key technologies in their draft agreement: drones, satellites, artificial intelligence (AI), electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, software-defined defence, cloud applications and hypersonic systems. What is often forgotten is that Europe already has one of the most advanced defence industries in the world. The goal now must go beyond producing more aircraft, tanks and ships. Europe needs a technology-driven defence strategy. Combat power in the future will be defined by speed, precision and automation. Networked sensors and digital integration on the battlefield, enhanced and accelerated by AI, are the main enablers.

The war in Ukraine shows that high-tech and mass must go hand in hand. Unmanned systems, surveillance and attack drones are central to both offensive and defensive operations. Combined with AI, their importance will only grow. They bring affordable mass to the battlefield and reinforce overstretched personnel. None of this is science fiction, as Ukraine’s daily combat experience proves. Procurement there has already adjusted to the speed of technological change. We must do the same, and invest more in Ukraine’s defence industry to maximise impact.

Even if the worst case does not come to pass and its partnership with America survives this age of monsters, Europe will still need as much technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy as possible—alongside the undeniable benefits of close transatlantic co-operation. The guiding principle, not only vis-à-vis China, will be derisking.

If Europe succeeds, it should soon move beyond the politics of reaction and finally regain the initiative. Time is short. Remember, two years after Gramsci’s death the second world war began. ■

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2025/04/17/a-former-boss-of-airbus-and-parliamentary-commissioner-on-how-to-turn-europe-into-a-global-power

For this article in pdf, please click here:

A former boss of Airbus and parliamentary commissioner on how to turn Europe into a global.

Download • 267KB

Thomas Enders is president of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and a former chief executive of Airbus. Hans-Peter Bartels is president of the German Society for Security Policy (GSP). He served in the Bundestag until 2020, where he chaired the defence committee and was parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces.

Illustration: Dan Williams