America keeps Ukraine fighting with its hands tied – The Economist – 15.09.24
- Michael Julien
- Sep 16, 2024
- 4 min read
Russian missiles blast its cities, but it still cannot strike back.
Hopes ran high on September 13th that Ukraine might finally be allowed to use British and French Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles against targets inside Russia. Joe Biden and Sir Keir Starmer, Britain’s prime minister, had spoken for two hours at the White House, and many thought the American president would finally grant his permission—needed, it is thought, because the missiles may draw on targeting information from American satellites and other sources in order to evade Russian defences, and some of them may contain American components.
But after the meeting, the situation remained just as uncertain. The American side merely confirmed that the policy of restricting Western-supplied long-range systems to targets within Ukraine had not changed. Vladimir Putin, clearly worried about an imminent change, had spent the previous few days making bloodcurdling threats of retribution to play on Mr Biden’s fears of escalation. Britain was singled out: the Kremlin thinks it is pushing to end restrictions. Just before the White House meeting Russia publicly announced it had decided, weeks earlier, to expel six British diplomats for spying, a charge Britain’s government called “completely baseless”.
It was always unrealistic to expect a grand declaration after the meeting. A decision might come after Mr Biden meets Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, probably towards the end of this week (either in Washington or at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York). Mr Zelensky said on September 13th that he would present Mr Biden with a “victory plan” based on “interconnected solutions” that would give Ukraine enough power “to put this war on a course to peace”.
Those solutions no doubt include the freedom to use Western missiles to hit military targets in Russia. Ukrainians are deeply angry that while Russia conducts a ruthless campaign against Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure using air-launched “glide bombs”, missiles and drones (some supplied by Iran and North Korea), Ukraine can use only its indigenously produced drones and missiles to strike back.
It is hard, Mr Zelensky wrote on X, “to repeatedly hear, ‘We are working on this,’ while Putin continues to burn down our cities and villages.” Anyone who can see on a map where Russia locates military facilities and launches strikes from “clearly understands why Ukraine needs long-range capabilities”.
Mr Zelensky’s frustration is understandable. In international law, the right of self-defence allows strikes on positions from which the aggressor’s attacks are launched or enabled. “There is no moral or legal reason for not going after these targets,” says Ben Hodges, a former commander of American forces in Europe.
The Biden administration has continually shifted its reasons for denying Ukraine permission to use longer-range missiles, such as the American-supplied ATACMS ballistic missile and the Storm Shadow/SCALP, against targets on Russian soil. In recent months, some officials have suggested that the administration does not want to jeopardise a future “reset” of relations with Moscow.
Other officials argue that letting Ukraine use ATACMS against targets in Russia would not change the strategic picture because there are not enough targets in range. Russia has moved most of the aircraft launching glide bombs to airfields beyond the missile’s range of 300km (186 miles).
Ideally long-range strikes should be followed up by ground forces, which Ukraine cannot send deep inside Russia. They also say the missile is a scarce and expensive resource that is better employed against targets in Crimea.
The notion that restraint on missile targeting might improve future relations with Russia seems far-fetched. Mr Putin has declared himself an enemy of the West and seeks the destruction of NATO. A “reset” would be possible only if Donald Trump wins America’s presidential election in November and agrees to give Mr Putin most of what he wants.
The claim that there are insufficient targets within ATACMS range to make much difference, meanwhile, is contested by the Institute for the Study of War, a think-tank. It has identified at least 230 targets, such as communications stations, logistics centres and ammunition warehouses, that would be hard for Russia to move but are currently off-limits to Ukraine’s missiles.
It is true that there are limited numbers of Storm Shadow/SCALPs, and Britain and France have not proposed reopening production lines. America needs enough ATACMS for its current war plans, but there are a lot of them (probably about 2,500): the missile entered service 30 years ago and is now being replaced by the US Army.
The real reason for Mr Biden’s reluctance is almost certainly fear of Russian escalation. Yet so many supposed Russian red lines have been crossed that Mr Putin’s warnings have lost much of their power. The latest came during Ukraine’s invasion of the Russian province of Kursk, when it used American-supplied GMLRS missiles against bridges and Russian troops. Mr Putin himself already claims Russia is fighting not just Ukraine but NATO. Even if alliance targeteers were assisting Ukraine in going after military installations in Russia, it would be hard for him to argue that anything fundamental had changed.
America overplays Putin’s threats, says Kurt Volker, an American former special representative for Ukraine. They are aimed at “deterring us from doing things, not that it has any bearing on what he’s really going to do”. Russia is already bombing Ukrainian cities. Sabotage and cyber-attacks against Ukraine’s allies would also be nothing new. Mr Putin has other options for further escalation; he might provide missiles to the Houthis in Yemen, for example. At the extreme, use of a tactical nuclear weapon can never be completely ruled out. But that would have dire consequences, and it is not clear why a change in American targeting policy would push him over the edge.
If Mr Biden does relent after meeting Mr Zelensky, there is unlikely to be a public announcement. A decision may be quietly communicated to Kyiv, to downplay its significance and to keep it secret. It may not be until targets in Russia are struck with Western missiles that a change will be confirmed. For Ukraine that cannot come a moment too soon.■
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