Could the army cope without more money and troops?
THE HALL OF Church House, nestled next to Westminster Abbey, is full of pious exhortations to peace and love. On July 22nd-23rd it was filled with military officers debating how to kill people more efficiently. General Sir Roly Walker, who became chief of the general staff in June, was one of those addressing the army’s annual land-warfare conference, run by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a think-tank. In his speech he set out his aim “to double our fighting power in three years and triple it by the end of the decade”.
In the past that might have been seen as a cynical ploy to pitch for more money and troops. Unusually, General Walker said he was not asking for either. Instead his plan reflects a fear that war might come sooner than anyone thinks.
General Walker sees 2027-28 as a moment in which Russian rearmament, China’s threat to Taiwan and Iran’s nuclear ambitions might come together in a “singularity”. (Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the chief of the defence staff and General Walker’s boss, is more relaxed: he argues that Russia would need five years to rebuild its army to the pre-2022 standard, and another five to fix deeper problems.)
Before the war in Ukraine, the British Army’s aim was to modernise slowly in the hope of building a battle-ready force by the early 2030s. That timeline has been shredded. General Walker’s plan is to eke out more combat power from the force at his disposal now. His idea is to create an “internet of military things” in which any sensor (a satellite or drone, say) can funnel data to any weapon, the entire process fuelled by artificial intelligence. “We will sense twice as far, decide in half the time, deliver effects over double the distance with half as many munitions,” he says, pointing to Ukraine’s military ingenuity.
Sceptics retort that the army is running on fumes. On July 23rd John Healey, the new defence secretary, reaffirmed Britain’s commitment to offer NATO a corps in any war with Russia—roughly, three divisions’ worth of troops, comprising six combat brigades plus enablers such as engineering and artillery units. That is fanciful.
The army currently has around 75,000 regular troops. In April General Sir Nick Carter, an ex-army chief, told Parliament that the army had calculated it would need 82,000 troops just to generate a single “warfighting” division. Manpower is not the only issue. RUSI estimates that deploying a single armoured brigade would absorb 70-80% of the army’s engineering capabilities for crossing rivers or minefields.
“The British Army has been handed a policy commitment by wider government that it is not resourced to deliver,” says Jack Watling, a RUSI expert whose writing has acquired cult status among generals. It is not the army’s place to set policy, he acknowledges. “But the rest of government needs to realise that demanding the impossible is grossly irresponsible.” The idea of a corps is a “fantasy”, says an American general who has worked closely with the British Army.
“They could project maybe two understrength brigades.” He suggests that Britain look to the US Marine Corps and do away with tanks entirely in favour of a smaller and lighter force that could “plug in” to an American division.
The task of advising on military priorities will fall to three outsiders undertaking a “root-and-branch” defence review announced by Mr Healey on July 16th. Lord Robertson, a NATO secretary-general in 1999-2003, will take the lead, supported by Sir Richard Barrons, a retired general, and Fiona Hill, a British-American expert on Russia who served in Donald Trump’s national-security council. That may lead to more resources for General Walker. But he isn’t banking on it. ■
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Photograph: UK MOD Crown copyright
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