How NATO’s European members can help Ukraine and help themselves, write Kurt Volker and Nico Lange for the Economist – 01.08.25
- Michael Julien
- Aug 8
- 3 min read
Ukraine can be the forward operating laboratory for Europe’s own future air security.
FROM THE moment Donald Trump returned to the White House, it had been an open question whether America would continue to supply weapons systems to Ukraine. Until recently. In July Mr Trump gave approval for America’s NATO allies in Europe to buy much-needed American weapons and ammunition for transfer to Ukraine.
That step is significant, and so are the possible ramifications. Mr Trump’s move has given NATO an explicit role in acquiring and delivering military aid to Ukraine. This is a sea change, with profound implications for the alliance, for Ukraine and, indeed, for Russia.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the administration of President Joe Biden was adamant that NATO should avoid direct involvement in the conflict. It feared that President Vladimir Putin might turn his war against Ukraine into a war between Russia and NATO, entailing a clash of superpowers. Yet the Biden administration’s self-imposed straightjacket ignored a simple truth. Putin cannot afford a confrontation with NATO while his forces are bogged down in Ukraine.
Now that Mr Trump has broken the taboo on having any role for NATO in Ukraine, all sorts of possibilities open up. We believe that, above all, NATO should help Ukraine with its air defences. Currently Ukraine has a hotch-potch of different systems. NATO can help integrate them and build a comprehensive, multi-layered system of air defence.
Consider Ukraine’s current rattlebag of defences: expensive modern systems like the American-made Patriots, Germany’s IRIS-T and the Norwegian-American NASAMS; self-propelled and rapid-fire guns; Soviet-era missile systems; a handful of capable radar aircraft; electronic jamming; improvised “Frankenstein” systems that combine legacy and modern technologies; and homemade drones. The Ukrainians deserve credit for using such a mishmash to remarkable effect. But their country’s air defence could be much smarter and more effective. NATO should lead an effort to turn disparate air-defence systems into a streamlined, interoperable whole. That would help not only Ukraine; crucially, it would help the entire eastern flank of NATO’s border with Russia.
NATO has expertise, technology and interoperability that it can bring to bear in Ukraine by unifying intelligence from various sources and deploying sensors to track drones and missiles. Using AI to assess threats more effectively would mean holding back costly air-defence missiles for major threats while cheaper systems handle, for instance, mass drone attacks. Integrating air defences—with layered interception, rapid command co-ordination and automated response—would boost protection. Better civilian co-ordination, in turn, would more effectively warn ordinary Ukrainians when to seek shelter.
In support of this air-defence mission, NATO should also help Ukraine by providing precision-guided missiles and other long-range weapons that can strike Russian airfields, launch sites, new drone gigafactories and command centres—taking out the archers, not just the arrows. Such power projection would have a real impact on decisions made in Moscow.
In the event of an eventual ceasefire, NATO’s European members have said they will provide a “reassurance force” inside Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression. These troops will need air-defence coverage, some of it probably projected from Poland and Romania. Ukraine’s future defence, in other words, will need seamless integration with NATO’s own air defences. NATO should start building that integration now.
Last, transforming Ukraine’s air defences in partnership with NATO would also provide NATO’s European members with the systems and know-how needed to strengthen air defences for their own people. The very systems NATO should build in Ukraine will protect Europe against the mass production of drones and missiles that Russia is already undertaking.
NATO should immediately assemble a coalition of experts, engineers, and planners to work closely with Ukraine’s defence leadership. A co-ordinated effort to combine sensors, systems, intelligence and AI into a resilient, scalable air shield should begin now. This is not merely about defending Ukraine. It is also about ensuring that NATO never faces a similar vulnerability.
In assisting Ukraine, there is no quick, simple fix. We must be prepared for a long and taxing conflict. But each incremental step in our assistance provides greater security and resilience not only for the people of Ukraine but also for Europe. Importantly, the steps we propose would show Mr Putin that he has already achieved his high-water mark in Ukraine, that his position will only worsen from here and that it is time for him to end the war. ■
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Kurt Volker is an American former ambassador to NATO and former special representative for Ukraine. Nico Lange is a former chief of staff to the German defence minister.
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