They both attempt escalating attacks that fall short of all-out war.
IN A SERIES of air and missile strikes in the early hours of August 25th Israel and Hizbullah, the Iran-backed militia in Lebanon, brought to a boil their simmering conflict. For now, at least, the strikes seem calibrated to avoid all-out war but it is a risky business. Just before 5am two waves of Israeli warplanes bombed dozens of Hizbullah’s missile-launch sites throughout southern Lebanon.
Minutes later Hizbullah launched at least 200 rockets and drones towards northern Israel. Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defence system intercepted most of these. The few that got through caused little damage and no Israeli casualties.
As the sun rose, both sides had their narratives prepared. Israel said that it had launched a “pre-emptive” attack after detecting preparations by Hizbullah to launch thousands of rockets and explosive drones. These were to be aimed mainly at military bases in Israel’s north, but a salvo of longer-range missiles was meant for the Glilot complex just north of Tel Aviv, where Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, and Unit 8200, the signals-intelligence directorate, have their headquarters. Israel’s air strikes destroyed “thousands” of missile tubes and prevented most of these launches.
Hizbullah claimed to have hit 11 Israeli bases in what it said was the “first phase” of its retaliatory response to the assassination in Beirut of its military chief, Fuad Shukr, by an Israeli air strike on July 30st. It claimed “total success”, ignored the Israeli attack and left open the possibility of further vengeance.
For four weeks the entire region has awaited the revenge promised by Hizbullah and Iran for the assassinations of Shukr, and of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, in a government guest-house in Tehran. The delay in part reflects the difficulty of Iran’s position. It could retaliate directly, but a large missile and drone attack by it on Israel in April was largely intercepted by Israel and its allies. A repeat of this sort of spectacle could illustrate Iran’s ineffectiveness, not its wrath. Alternatively, were Iran to seek to launch an even bigger direct strike it could trigger an all-out war with devastating consequences. To deter Iran, America has now moved two aircraft-carrier strike-groups to the Middle East.
Rocket and drone strikes by Hizbullah are a somewhat less-risky alternative for Iran, the militia’s sponsor. And it is far from clear that Hizbullah itself seeks a full-scale war with Israel in Lebanon. It was almost certainly aware that Israeli intelligence would detect its preparations and carry out some form of pre-emptive action. Both Hizbullah, and by extension Iran, want to save face by being seen to punish Israel. But they, and Israel, are trying to avoid the type of military action that would lead to a more intense conflict.
Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, said that Israel’s strike was “not the end of the story,” but Israeli officials are eager to emphasise they are not interested in escalating further. After experimenting unsuccessfully with a direct attack in April, perhaps Iran has reverted to its previous strategy of fighting Israel through proxies like Hizbullah. If that is the case, it may be a surprising win for the relatively moderate line of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, over the hardline generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, who have urged drastic retaliation.
Neither side wants to be blamed for scuppering the laborious talks over a ceasefire in Gaza, which trundle on. Shortly after the strikes in Lebanon were over, the Israeli government announced that its negotiating team would leave as scheduled for another round of talks in Cairo. Ending the war in Gaza, which, according to Hamas’s health ministry, has killed 40,000 people, including Hamas fighters, in the coastal strip, might help end the present cycle of escalation before it spirals out of control.
But whether a ceasefire in Gaza defuses the bigger conflict between Iran and its proxies and Israel seems far less certain. The optimistic view is that the entire region might step back from the brink, and that a ceasefire would open up a pathway to Saudi Arabia recognising Israel, and following that America, Israel and the Gulf Arab states co-operating more deeply on defence in order to contain Iran, their common adversary.
Yet there are many unknowns: who will occupy the White House; who will ultimately win the opaque struggle between reformers and hardliners within Iran; and whether Israel can tolerate daily rocket attacks on its northern communities, or will eventually mobilise to launch a bigger campaign against Hizbullah aimed at destroying its massive Iran-supplied missile arsenal. Even if the latest exchange of hostilities peters out it is unlikely the longer war will. ■
For this article in pdf, please click here:
Comments