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Ukraine has found a path to victory – by Michael Bohnert for The Telegraph – 23.08.24

If given sufficient quantities of Western aid, Kyiv could have the capability to begin restoring its territory in 2025.


Make no mistake: recent Ukrainian operations in the Kursk Oblast of Russia have the potential to significantly stretch Russian forces not just in that region, but everywhere. I say this as someone whose job it is to monitor them and other matters in the industrial-military sphere. Ukraine has pulled of an operation that could buy much needed time for Western aid to arrive and allow replenishment of Ukrainian forces. Furthermore, in an aspect little discussed, the incursion puts in doubt Russia’s ability to launch any major offensives for the remainder of the year.


Russia, lest we forget, has devoted its entire force into Ukraine, and especially the Donbas. I believe it will be forced to choose between securing the Kursk Oblast and continuing offensives in the Donbas. Prior to the Kursk incursion, Russia was absorbing roughly 1,000 casualties a day, with corresponding equipment losses. Meanwhile, Russia’s recruitment efforts at 20,000 to 30,000 a month and vehicle production were roughly matching losses. This fact has left Russia with few reserve units capable of countering manoeuvring Ukrainian armour in Kursk and Belgorod.


Moscow faces a choice. It would likely require several months of recruitment and military production to stop Ukrainian advances and begin the process of securing Kursk. Ukrainian forces in that region have the advantage of not needing to defend Ukrainian territory, which means Kyiv can choose optimal locations to defend in the region, making Russian counter-offensives exceptionally costly. Alternatively, Russia could continue operations in the Donbas and pay the domestic price of ignoring the Ukrainian incursion and effectively ceding parts of Kursk and Belgorod to Ukraine. It is too early to say which Putin will opt for.


Crunching the numbers and assessing the satellite imagery, it was clear to me and others that throughout the war, restrictions from the West on Ukrainian incursions, with no such reciprocal restrictions on Russia, forced Ukraine to fortify its entire line, while Russia enjoyed the luxury of safety along its border. This allowed Russia to devote more troops to fighting in the Donbas. The recent Ukrainian operation into Kursk now changes the equation, requiring Russia to reinforce its entire border. That would require tens of thousands of troops, hundreds of vehicles, and fortification resources. To do so will require the Kremlin to devote months’ worth of recruitment and resupply.


Ukraine’s incursion is also altering Russian air operations. For months, Russia has been able to safely drop glide bombs onto fixed Ukrainian positions in the Donbas. Ukrainian mobile operations in Kursk require much more dynamic air operations. Ukrainian drones have downed numerous Russian drones, blinding Moscow to battlefield conditions. Russian helicopters have proven to be vulnerable to Ukrainian drones in Kursk while Ukrainian drone strikes on airfields in western Russia have limited fixed wing aircraft presence. Russia is now forced to fly longer distances in attempts to stop Ukraine in Kursk. Longer flights translate to fewer Russian bombs dropped a day. We are already seeing fewer daily strikes in the Donbas.


In short, Russian ground and air forces are stretched in a way they have not been throughout the war. This will slow Russian operations over the next few months, bleeding into the rainy autumns and bitter cold winters that halt operations in Ukraine. Stricter and broader enforcement of Western sanctions by Ukraine’s allies and increased Ukrainian strikes on Russian airfields, energy infrastructure, and logistics will only further stretch Russian forces and defence industrial base. This provides Ukraine the opportunity to regenerate and reequip forces between now and the Spring of 2025.


But Western aid is crucial to this, and if given in sufficient quantities could significantly improve Ukrainian capabilities to begin restoring its territory in 2025.


Ukraine has regained a path forward to victory. Ukraine’s allies should not squander this opportunity. Ending the conflict quickly is the goal, but it must be from a position of Ukrainian strength.



For this article in pdf, please click here:



Michael Bohnert is an engineer at RAND, a non-profit, nonpartisan research institution.


Credit: Ukrainian soldiers take part in a training exercise



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