He is leading Russia into a new phase of strategic confrontation, says Stephen Covington, a long-time NATO adviser.
WHEN VLADIMIR PUTIN invaded Ukraine in 2022, many Western observers thought it a temporary regional crisis that ultimately would settle into a frozen conflict. Two and a half years later, this view is challenged by a more consequential reality.
The Russian leader’s goal is not just to break Ukraine and stop its quest for a place in the family of Western democracies, but to dismantle the American-led security system that emerged after the second world war. In that sense Mr Putin is fomenting a revolution: using the strategy and tactics of revolution against the Western system. His war against Ukraine is inextricably linked to the strategic objective of his revolution.
In the early 1990s Russia’s reformers judged that the country could be competitive only by integrating itself into the global economy and stepping away from confrontation with the West. The past 20 years of Mr Putin’s rule have been characterised by two very different, concurrent patterns: the stage-by-stage dismantling of democracy and freedoms inside Russia, and an intensifying campaign to delegitimise the West, its democratic values and the institutions that uphold them.
Inside Russia the results have been greater repression against the Russian people, greater power for the security services, greater wealth for Kremlin-connected business leaders and greater investment in the armed forces. Outside Russia Mr Putin has increasingly pressured the America-led global order; sought to undermine norms, principles, and rules of Western institutions; organised regional and global opposition to the West; and conducted military action in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria.
Mr Putin now asserts that the Western system poses an existential threat to the sovereignty of Russia and the values it should hold. He speaks of two sharply contrasting visions of the future: either the Western system continues to exist and Russia is strategically defeated, or the Western system is replaced and Russia continues to exist. He is convinced that Russia has reached a historical crossroads in its post-Soviet development and that dismantling the existing global order and building a new one is fundamental to Russia’s greater-power aspirations. His revolutionary push is motivated by both internal power-preservation aims and external power-expansion aims.
His revolution values Russian advantage and gain of power over the West more than coexistence, mutual security, crisis avoidance and stability with the West. His security vision requires a Europe without NATO, and without organisations that uphold the fundamental principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. That vision also involves Russian co-operation with other countries to curb American power in the Arctic, Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.
His “all of Russia” revolution and war are now shaping how Russia is organised, how society is mobilised, how industry is prioritised, how foreign policy is aligned, how the army is structured and how communications are conducted. His legitimacy as a leader of Russia—and his place in history—are now inextricably tied to this revolution. He portrays himself as the only leader who can guide Russia through this crossroads of history. Mr Putin’s pursuit of advantage and power is unlikely to be replaced by caution in pursuit of stability.
Neither his revolution nor his war is near its end. In Ukraine he is pursuing several strategic actions simultaneously. By intensifying military operations and attacking Ukraine’s infrastructure he hopes to weaken its defence, demoralise its armed forces and create among the broader population a sense of inevitable Russian victory. He is also seeking to divide Ukraine politically. And he wants to damage the West’s will to continue supporting Ukraine in the war.
The signs are that Mr Putin will continue to pursue this revolution-and-war approach, further locking the country’s politics, economy and armed forces into a structure that can only sustain revolution and war. It is unlikely that he will stop the revolution, demobilise the armed forces, deconstruct the war economy or re-embrace acceptance of the Western system. It is equally unlikely that he will seek political, economic, conflict-resolution or arms agreements with Western countries. This revolution and war will put enormous stress on Russian society—a price that Mr Putin appears willing to pay.
Mr Putin has chosen decisive paths to advance Russian power. He is leading Russia into a new phase of strategic confrontation with the West over the America-led regional and global order. Given his logic, this reality is not a temporary crisis-management challenge. The West must continue to support Ukraine’s right to self-defence and strengthen the collective security and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area and globally, as part of a strategic pattern to manage Russia’s pressure and assault on a global security system. Absent these steps, Mr Putin would have the opportunity to match a level of aggression against the Western system with his level of revolutionary ambition.
In late 2022, Mr Putin predicted that ahead lay “probably the most dangerous, unpredictable and, at the same time, important decade since the end of World War II”—a state of affairs that he said was “fraught with global conflicts”. His destabilising, calculated revolution and war against Ukraine—Mr Putin’s choices for Russia—could make his prediction a reality. He is organising and preparing Russia for this future, not setting a course to avoid it. ■
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Stephen R Covington is Strategic and International Affairs Adviser to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He has advised 12 SACEURs since 1989. This article is based on a paper to be published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views are the author’s own.
Illustration: Dan Williams
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